Limited liability is a human invention which has facilitated enormous economic growth around the world, particularly since the time of its general application in advanced countries during the nineteenth century. The individual legal identity of companies, coupled with the limited liability of their owners, has provided protection for investors from the risks associated with their investments. It has thus contributed to increase the sources of capital available to finance projects which might otherwise have been considered unviable. However, the legal protection offered to investors has negative consequences for other participants in economies. Speculation in stock markets often damages society.
Introduction
This article will analyse a variety of academic texts which describe a series of drawbacks associated with the historical development of the limited liability model of business ownership and management. It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the issues involved, but rather an examination of some specific reflections and ideas proposed by some selected scholars. 1 The ideas expressed will be compared with the extensive bibliography which defends contemporary financial institutions by studying the benefits they have provided throughout their history. To understand such theses, it will be important to examine the historical origins of limited liability and its development during recent centuries and to consider authors who express confidence in the future evolution of financial innovations.
We will then proceed to evaluate studies which suggest proposals to improve the operation of limited liability, some of which have been implemented at certain times during the contemporary period of history. They aim at correcting the imbalance created by protecting shareholders at the expense of other participants in economic activities.
Drawbacks of the Limited Liability Business Model
The limited liability company is a legal structure by which the capital ownership of a business is divided into shares. Shareholders do not respond personally for business debts: their liabilities are limited to the amount of their investment. The model has deep historical roots and is a fully consolidated in day-to-day commerce practically everywhere. However, during three major problems. Firstly, creditors would be subject to fraud either through their ignorance of the limited liability status of their debtors or through an excessive confidence in company accounts -often unreliable. Secondly, speculation would be increased because of the transfer of investor risk to company creditors and the consequent seduction of gullible investors expecting easy profits. Thirdly, for Lord Curriehill companies enjoying limited liability would benefit from a protection which would be unavailable to traditional businesses, thus creating unfair competition (Bryer 1997: 47) .
The doubts which surrounded limited liability in England in 1856 were a reflection of the debate which had taken place forty-five years earlier in the United States prior to the approval of the 1811 New York Act which generalised the institution of the limited liability company in certain industrial sectors in North America. Robert J. Shiller (Shiller 2004: 271) refers to the work of the historian David Moss who documented an impressive number of arguments against the law that were debated by the American legislators (Moss 2004) . Many political representatives considered that the protection offered to shareholders from the consequences of business losses would provide them with an incentive to carry out excessively risky operations. Under the new law shareholders would not have to pay all the losses incurred if these legal obligations can be very profound in relation to the personal ethics of the managers and their sense of social responsibility. A series of experiments has been carried out which demonstrates that the great majority of top executives in North American companies place profits before moral beliefs when confronted with opportunities to work for the general benefit of society. Even more interesting is that the same experiments have demonstrated quite different results in the case of partners in businesses which are not limited liability companies (Rose 2007: 323-330 ). The implication is that whatever effort that might be directed towards educating company managers in professional ethics is practically useless: their decisions will always be determined by their legal obligations to maximise profits.
There are many specific cases that can be studied in order to understand who might be the victims of this exclusive obligation to maximise benefits for shareholders whilst ignoring the interests of other business participants. Here, due to the need for brevity, we will consider just one example. The history of the British confectionery group Cadbury, and the struggle to control the company up to the time of its acquisition by Kraft in 2010, provides an illustration of the way corporations have been managed under the limited liability model (Bell 2013 , Mayer 2013 , Funding Universe 2014 , Grace's Guide 2014 . Throughout the 19 th century and a large part of the 20 th century the Cadbury family involved all the stakeholders 3 in the running of the business. The executives attended to the needs of the employees and demonstrated a limited liability companies. The interests of one particular group (shareholders, beneficiaries of the legal protection which limited their liabilities) took priority over the rest, and the longterm financial performances of the businesses concerned were jeopardised.
In 2009 in the USA Kraft Foods Inc. launched a takeover bid for Cadbury plc. It met with fierce opposition from three groups: British public opinion because of the loss of a brand identified with the national culture; the main unions which feared a wave of redundancies as a result of the acquisition; and a significant number of politicians who were worried about the possible transfer of activities to other countries and a consequent avoidance of UK tax.
Protests were also heard relating to the multi-million pound fees charged by the banks involved in the deal. Despite all these objections, however, Kraft Foods Inc. was able to complete the acquisition in February 2010 because it met with shareholder approval. The acquisition price was £11,5bn (approximately €14,5bn), financed by borrowings of £7,0bn
(approximately €9,0bn). Paradoxically, the main lender turned out to be RBS, a bank controlled by the British government following the rescue of the banking sector during the financial crisis in 2008.
4 Public company takeovers occur when a person (normally a limited company) makes an offer to buy the shares of a stock-market quoted company with the objective of achieving a significant participation in its capital and corresponding voting rights. In many cases takeovers constitute a threat to the employment of the directors of the target company who try to persuade shareholders to reject the offer. It should be noted that the term "public company" in the United Kingdom refers to the company's shares being held and traded by the general public and does not generally signify any kind of state ownership. (Easterbrook and Fischel 1985: 95-96) , of takeovers being healthy mechanisms which always bring benefits.
The Defence of Limited Liability Based on History
There are a number of prestigious authors who consider that modern financial markets, based on limited liability, provide the basis of economic growth in the world. For Robert J. Shiller (Shiller 2004: 267-273 and 2012: 87-94 (Shiller 2012: 17, 88, 102) .
Max Gillman and Tim Eade (Gillman and Eade 1995: 20) explain that the evolution of the corporate form was related to changes in trading practices during the industrial revolution, characterised by a greater degree of specialisation. The expansion of trade created a need for organisational improvements to reduce transaction costs 5 . Just as manufactured products and workers were becoming more and more specialised, so the corporate structure needed to evolve. The incorporation of businesses and the limitation of the financial liabilities of shareholders appear to be products of this demand for specialisation in the corporate form.
In this respect the observations of the great industrial historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (Chandler 1990: 9-10 ) are also relevant. For this author the advantages of limited liability are evident. In the USA the spread of the railway and telegraph networks demanded the appearance of a new type of business. The massive investments necessary for their construction brought about a separation between ownership and management. Companies, now much larger, came to be managed by teams of professionals. Shareholders, now protected from possible ruin in the case of business failure, could afford to distance themselves from the day-to-day affairs of the businesses they owned.
Other authors emphasise the social benefits of the limited liability company. For R. A. Bryer (Bryer 1997: 38-39) businesses (they assumed all the risk and so felt compelled to exercise full operational control). Furthermore, for the capital to be social it was not only profits that had to be shared equally between investors but also losses -which was achieved by limiting such losses to the amount of capital invested.
David McBride (McBride 2011: 3) explains that the legal corporate structure had a number of advantages over other forms, the most important being the doctrine relating to limited liability.
6 Since the construction of railway networks in the middle of the 19 th century large capital investments became essential for progress. The creation of common funds for numerous investors became an important means of raising capital, but investors were not disposed to place money in businesses which they did not control if they were to expose themselves to an unlimited liability for debts. In this respect the limitation of their liabilities was critical not only for the development of the corporation but also for the national economy in general. Other advantages of the corporate form included the use of modern management techniques which were developed during the late 19 th and the early 20 th centuries by professional managers who were not owners, as well as perpetual existence (considered below) and the ability to carry out mergers.
For Margaret Blair (Blair 2004: 3) one of the great advantages of incorporation 7 for North American businesses in the 19 th century was related to the difficulties in the financing of complex projects which depended on a series of inputs during a long period of time and where outputs were not easily divisible in portions or parts attributable to the inputs. A business controlled by partners had the major disadvantage that any one of them could withdraw at any 6 The word liability in English implies a legal obligation to make a payment. In some languages it has the same translation as responsibility although in English it does not have the moral connotation of such a term. 7 Incorporation: the concession of an individual legal status to a business which thereby becomes a company or corporation. The liabilities associated with the business are passed to the company and no longer pertain to the shareholders as individuals. affairs of the owners from the management of the business and thus avoiding its possible closure on the death of his old partner (Blair 2004: 15-19 ).
Andrew A. Schwartz (Schwartz 2012: 765-830 ) also discusses the perpetual nature of the limited liability company. He attributes it the merit of ensuring a long-term future for the corporation which acts as an immortal investor. It allows for a sustainable growth in economies and implies a concern for the future which incentivises activities which are socially beneficial for the whole community. Immortal investors by definition expect less short-term profit than mortal ones, thereby creating a longer-lasting and more sustainable wealth. It is an extremely optimistic vision of the corporation. Schwartz considers that management short-termism can be solved by better education and by the use of techniques to promote a historical and long-lasting identity in the business (images, hymns, logos….). The same author recognises that many perpetual companies have human owners (and so can hardly be considered to be immortal in relation to their objectives), but points out that there are also a large number whose owners are other companies which do have a perpetual nature. 18) it was created and was successful in a world which was simpler than it is today. The increase in the size and complexity of corporations and of financial markets has led to new problems with respect to the most efficient and fair organisation, combined with difficulties associated with the maintenance of the confidence necessary for its effective operation in society and in markets, and with the facilitation of a healthy flow of information and communication between interested parties. It may be that modern challenges demand an experimentation with new organisational structures in order to determine, by a process of trial and error, which are the ones that best overcome the difficulties. The identification of reductions in the risks taken on by businesses is important for this article because it implies a greater concern on the part of shareholders about the consequences of business activities. By sharing losses with other business participants, they have an incentive to demand a style of management more in line with the interests of everyone involved.
Furthermore, double or multiple liability is interesting because it offers an alternative to more as a market-driven mechanism to reduce banking risk.
The practice of multiple liability terminated in the nineteen thirties, principally for three reasons. Firstly, the financial ruin of many shareholders who had had no influence in the management of failed banks generated political pressure to change the law. Secondly, the wave of banking failures in the nineteen thirties was believed to imply that the law had not fulfilled its objectives. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the imposition of federal insurance for deposits was held to indicate that multiple liability was no longer relevant. Early evaluations by contemporary authors concluded that the decision of the majority of states to abandon multiple liability in the nineteen thirties constituted irrefutable proof of its inefficiency (Marquis and Smith 1937: 502) . However, more recent quantitative studies, like
Grossman's, have thrown a more favourable light on the experience.
In order to ascertain whether multiple liability affected risk-taking in banks Grossman examined their balance sheets and looked at data surrounding bank failures as a means of evaluating management policy. He recognised that the use of such data had its limitations as a way of measuring operational risk but other options were just too complicated.
Grossman concludes that it is possible that shareholder liability laws did play a role in the assumption of risk by managers, and that multiple liability did reduce banking risk in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century. The effects could be seen in the rate of failures, capital / asset ratios, and liquidity rates of banks in states where multiple liability was adopted. It is true that these state banks were unable to avoid the effects of the crisis during the nineteen thirties, but such effects have generally been evaluated using data on liquidations and
Grossman suggests that in many cases prudent bankers would be the first to liquidate their depositors' losses in national banks (with multiple liability) amounted to no more than seventy-seven cents per thousand dollars. For these two authors history has demonstrated that in the USA a mistake was made when multiple liability was abandoned in favour of a deposit insurance scheme administered by the government.
Corporate Social Responsibility
The idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) represents a continual commitment on the part of an organisation to behave ethically and contribute to economic development whilst endeavouring to improve the quality of life of its employees (and their families), local communities and society in general (Lindgreen and Swaen 2010: 3, Watts and Holme 1999) .
It could be said that its application constitutes a recognition of the need to compensate imbalances created by the legal form of limited liability which obliges business managers to work exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.
For Richard Marens (Marens 2012: 64-76 themselves to be intermediaries whose objective was to balance the interests of the different classes of person associated with their businesses (Marens 2012: 75) . Although the term stakeholder wasn't invented until the nineteen sixties, it seems clear that the concept was already being developed. In 1917 Henry Ford explained that the objectives of his company were for everyone to be able to contribute, to create employment, to manufacture a car which people wanted….and by the way to make a profit. He introduced the notion of business as a service to society (Lee 2008: 54) .
During the Great Depression and the interventionist policies of the New Deal, corporations paid less attention to their social obligations. However, once the Second World War was over, CSR began to grow. A book published in 1953 by Howard Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (Bowen 1953) , described the obligations of businesses with respect to the social consequences of their activities. It was a work which provided the necessary intellectual backing to reflect on the rapid social change which would take place in the following decades. During the nineteen fifties and sixties numerous new laws were enacted to regulate business and to protect employees and consumers. Furthermore, the birth of a large number of consumer protest movements led to declarations by companies about CSR and to hundreds of books and articles analysing the issue (Lee 2008: 56-58) . Nevertheless, publications critical of CSR also began to appear. In 1962 Milton Friedman (Friedman 1962) argued that the only social responsibility of a corporation was to make money for its shareholders and considered CSR to be a subversive doctrine. Ned Dobos (Dobos 2011: 273) explains that for libertarians being a shareholder was not a manner of avoiding natural positive duties (benefitting from the participation in a company without assuming the associated responsibilities), because such duties did not exist. 
Means to Create Greater Investor Commitment
As has been observed in the case of Cadbury, one of the major drawbacks of the limited liability company is the short-termism of shareholders who tend to speculate rather than invest. Directors of quoted companies are constrained in their management by the presence in the shareholders' register of new members who are looking for quick profits. These members provoke instability because they seek a rapid revaluation of their shares arising from the volatility which derives from rumours about a possible takeover, a higher takeover offer, a sudden change in sales or production strategy, the substitution of existing directors for new more aggressive managers, or even the cancellation of long-term investment projects. (Mayer 2013: 92) .
For Colin Mayer a corporation is characterised by a diversity of commitments -to shareholders and to other stakeholders. However, shareholders are able to practice speculative dealing which forces directors to offer them an immediate reward. In many cases they achieve can take cash out of the company because they have voting rights over its future. By this means an investment fund can buy shares in a company subject to a takeover bid. By doing so it assumes no responsibility for the company's operations nor any commitment to other participants. It can use the shares to vote in favour of the takeover and so achieve an immediate profit -a process which thus provides a means of diverting corporate profits in favour of one of the participants, the shareholder, at the expense of the others (Mayer 2013: 185-186) One proposal to avoid such a diversion of profits would be to grant more independence to directors. However, this solution would create agency problems relating to the directors seeking personal gains in detriment to the corporation. Other more interesting proposals focus on differentiating investors in accordance with their degree of commitment.
Currently any assessment of the commitment of shareholders is very difficult because there is no way for them to indicate their intentions regarding the time they expect to maintain ownership of their holdings. Hence those who wish to sell after a few days have the same voting rights on company decisions as those who wish to retain their holdings for a number of years. The first group bear the consequences of their voting decision during an insignificant period, and the second group during an extended period. But both groups exercise the same influence at the time of taking a decision that can affect the results of the company for many 9 Hedge funds are investment funds originally conceived to protect investors by providing a means of making small investments, the results of which were expected to inversely reflect the market (hence insuring an investment portfolio in the face of market movements). In practice they are often used as instruments of financial speculation. Voss, two decades ago a share would be held by its owner for an average of a few days, whilst today the average length of ownership is twenty-two seconds (Voss 2013).
Mayer proposes that shareholders should register the time period during which they intend to retain their shares and that they should receive voting rights corresponding to the time remaining up to disposal. Thus a share with ten years to go before maturity should have ten times the vote of one with only a year up to maturity. Those shareholders who do not wish to commit themselves to keeping their shares could maintain them outside the register and forego voting rights. In this way the company would be able to access short-term capital in the financial markets which would thereby continue to exercise a very important role in the fixing of share prices and the flow of information, but would be controlled by committed shareholders (Mayer 2013: 206-214) .
This proposal of a register would concede voting rights in proportion to the future commitment of shareholders and would restrict decisions concerning takeovers to shareholders committed to the future prosperity of the company in the long term.
Conclusion
Since its beginnings the institution of the limited liability company has been subject to debate.
The limitation of shareholders' responsibilities transfers business risks to other participants in the company's activities such as suppliers, customers and workers. In this way acquiring shares in companies has been turned into a purely financial operation.
Investors are motivated by short-term profit objectives and managers are ever more obliged to work towards goals which have little or nothing to do with the prosperity of the company in the long-term.
The study of the history of limited liability and its impact on economic development is very important in order to evaluate not just the drawbacks but also the positive aspects of its invention. It has made rapid economic growth possible, facilitating the provision of capital for projects which would otherwise been delayed or considered to be unviable. Many authors not only praise these aspects of limited liability but consider that they form part of an evolutionary process, always positive, which will lead to ever more sophisticated forms of investment and which will bring greater economic success.
Nevertheless, the objective of this article has been to point out failures in the corporation. An increasing number of texts support the need to find ways of achieving growth which seek the commitment of all the members of a company in equal measure. They invite a reflection on the drawbacks of a legal form which stresses the relationship between two participants (shareholders and managers) in detriment to all the others.
The historical application of the concepts of multiple liability and Corporate Social
Responsibility demonstrate the recognition by society of difficulties associated with the limited liability model; and recent proposals concerning the need to compensate the economic privileges that limited liability concedes to shareholders, by means of enforcing greater
